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Abstract: 
Recent researches have worked on the relationship between Corporate Governance and 
expected rates on return as well as historical returns. Firstly, we construct an Index of 
Corporate Governance (CGQL) that measures the quality implementation of Corporate 
Governance of the enlisted firms on the Athens Stock Exchange distinguishing the firms into 
Democracies and Dictatorships. An investment strategy that buys Democracies and shorts 
Dictatorships earns abnormal returns of around 18% annually during the sample period. In 
this paper we investigate if Corporate Governance matters in investors’ decisions. We try to 
observe if Corporate Governance is a proxy for firm valuation, a factor of creating and 
altering abnormal returns, or a risk factor, which can be a “substitute” for market risk 
(beta), using uni- and multi-variate analyses. The conclusions call into question the utility of 
Corporate Governance upon firm attractiveness. 
 
 
Key Words: 
Corporate Governance, Asset Prices, Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns, Beta, Firm Value 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Department of Business Administration, University of Patras, Greece, e-mail: a.toudas@cmc.gov.gr 
2 Department of Business Administration, University of Patras, Greece, email: bellas@upatras.gr 
 
59 
Corporate Governance and Its Effect on Firm Value and Stock Returns  
of Listed Companies on the Athens Stock Exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term Corporate Governance was barely presented before the decade of 90’s, 
although unclassified and non-scientifically proved evidence exist since the date of 
Adam Smith. Unfortunately, the usage of Corporate Governance did not follow the 
rapid research of the concept of Corporate Governance. It can be characterized as a 
system of principles, which are concerned about the management and the 
administration of organizations. Through Corporate Governance organizations can 
be more efficiently governing, transparent, and can control the actions as well as the 
proceedings of managers. 
 
However, there is not a convergence of thoughts between various researchers as far 
as the exact interpretation of this concept. Keasey and Wright (1993) think 
Corporate Governance as “the system of principles that includes the structures, the 
approached, the values, and the systems, which contribute to the successful 
management of organizations”. Keasey, Thompson and Wright (1997) consider that 
Corporate Governance contains the wide system of formal and informal connections 
that are related with the organization as well as their consequences for the society. 
Another more general approach is that of Mayer (1988). According to the 
researcher, “Corporate Governance is concerned about the ways through which the 
interests of managers and investors can be reconciled in order organizations to 
operate in favor of investors”. 
 
Many facts and conditions have driven to an increased demand for good Corporate 
Governance. The springs of this demand were various negative acts, which hit the 
business world. Examples of these acts are: creative accounting, managers who 
service only their own interests and go against investors’ interests, weakness of 
auditors to control and report companies efficiently (for example, Enron scandal), 
enormous compensations for managers that in some cases threatened the company’s 
performance, policies of some investors for easy money etc. The representative 
examples of organizations’ collapses give reasons to strongly believe that firm value 
is not exclusively depended on profitability ratios or/and growth prospects, but also 
on the quality of the control mechanisms, which ensure that organizations are well-
managed as well as investors’ wealth is increased. Finally, this situation led to the 
presentation and establishment of management and administration principles named 
Corporate Governance. 
 
Tightened rules and regulations and the adoption of the codes (Cadbury Report, 
Greenbury Report) are the result which derives from the fact that better Corporate 
Governance will deliver higher shareholder value. In favor of this aspect, McKinsey 
and Company (2000) found that institutional investors are willing to pay significant 
premiums for companies that are well governed and that the valuation of a firm 
depends not only on financial issues but also on Corporate Governance. Moreover, 
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Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) have shown that investors in 
Germany are willing to pay a 20.2% premium for a company with high quality of 
Corporate Governance compared to another identical company but with a poor 
quality of Corporate Governance. The reason why investors are willing to pay this 
premium is the fact that the expected rate of return on equity is reduced as well as 
firm value is increased. Under these proportions and acceptances, can Corporate 
Governance change the expected rates of return across companies as well as create 
perceivable value for shareholders? 
 
Corporate Governance tries to clarify the rights and the obligations of every single 
individual or company that are involved in the organization’s governance. Zingales 
(1998) believes that there is an agency relationship between principals and agents. 
The principle-agent problem is the generative cause of the existence of Corporate 
Governance. While the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (henceforth CAPM) 
predicts that expected returns on equity depend exclusively on the size of covariance 
risk and not on Corporate Governance, the level of agency costs nowadays varies 
among different governance systems. These agency costs make Corporate 
Governance to be important for explaining the cross-section of expected returns of 
assets (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002). 
 
Under these assumptions, the more qualitative the implementation of Corporate 
Governance is, the less rate of return is required for investors in order to monitor 
managers and the less is the cost of capital (Lombardo and Pagano, 2000). Only if 
we approach Corporate Governance with various models can we reveal the relation 
between the quality level of Corporate Governance implementation and various 
expressions and approximations of expected returns. Actually, we conclude that 
Corporate Governance does not contribute to the creation of excess returns nor is it a 
factor that contributes to their alteration. Also, Corporate Governance is not a risk 
factor that investors of Athens Stock Exchange (henceforth ASE) take into deep 
consideration. 
 
It is noticeable the fact that governance codes are not compulsory regulations for 
any kind of company in Greece as it is in Germany with the “German Corporate 
Governance Code” (Drobetz et al., 2004). Thus, Corporate Governance is not 
viewed as an obligation but rather as a chance for changing. 
 
The remainder is as follows. Section 2 cites the model through which we will test 
Corporate Governance as a risk factor. Section 3 contains the construction of the 
Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and variance analyses between 
CGQL and Financial Measures plus Valuation Ratios. Section 4 explores the factors, 
which create as well as shift returns. Section 5 presents the relationship between 
CGQL and expected return on equity. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Corporate Governance, Historical Returns, Financial Measures, Valuation 
Rations, and Risk: Modelling the Relations 
 
At this point, we are confined in the creation of some basic assumptions, which are 
going to be tested at a posterior section. Firstly, quality level of Corporate 
Governance must be a measurable variable. We develop the control variable named 
“Corporate Governance Quality Level” (CGQL) as an appropriate measure-proxy of 
quality implementation of Corporate Governance for every sample firm. This will 
help us in measuring the relation between Corporate Governance and the expected 
rate of return on equity. The quantification of the CGQL, which is a quality variable, 
is presented in the next section. 
 
In a first step, we try to discover any relationship between Corporate Governance 
and firm value as well as correlation with historical returns. Following partially 
previous researches (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Black, 
Jang and Kim, 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Thalassinos and Zampeta, 2012; 
Havlíček, Břečková and Zampeta, 2013; Břečková and Havlíček, 2013), we relate 
CGQL with firm value as it is measured by the book-to-market ratio and market 
capitalization in a univariate analysis. Our hypothesis is that we will be in line with 
the results of the majority of researchers and find a significant relationship. 
However, while some studies apply the technique of the two-stage least square 
regression (Drobetz et al., 2004), we are going to seek whether good quality of 
Corporate Governance causes increased returns and firm value using the Ordinary 
Least Squares Method (O.L.S.). 
 
In a second step, our aim is to estimate whether expected returns are explained (at 
least) merely by the coefficient of RMRF (variable of the three-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993)) or/and they are related with another factor too, named 
“governance risk”.  
 
To start with, bear in mind that CAPM implies a linear relationship between 
expected returns and market betas. Beta is regarded as the factor, which completely 
explains the cross-section of expected returns. Following the rationale of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) Lombardo (2000), Lombardo and Pagano (2000), as well as 
Drobetz et al. (2004) we relate expected returns not only with betas but also with an 
additional risk measure, which is the quality level of Corporate Governance. Using 
this method, we are able to confirm or to contradict the hypothesis that not only beta 
– that is the quotient with covariance for numerator and variance of the returns of 
the market for denominator – but also CGQL are factors, which completely describe 
the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. CGQL is the factor with elements 
corresponding to the “Corporate Governance Quality Level”. In addition to the 
above, the equation that will reveal if not only market betas but also the quality of 
firms’ Corporate Governance performs in the mutation of expected returns is: 
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  iiiT CGQLr 210     (1) 
Where: 
Dependent variable iTr  depicts the geometric mean of historical returns over the 
sample period (T ) from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006 for firm i. 
Independent variable i  denotes the beta of every firm i. 
1  is the coefficient of CAPM beta. 
Coefficient 2  can be regarded as the reward for risk related to the firm’s quality of 
Corporate Governance. 
0  is the intercept of the equation. 
  is the residual. 
 
The acceptance of the null hypothesis is that 00  , 01  , and 02  . In other 
words, Corporate Governance of every single firm does not have any explanatory 
power for the explanation of the expected returns’ fluctuation. The execution of 
regression model (1) as well as the conclusions, which derive from its analysis, can 
be found in section 5. 
 
3. Data Mining, Definition of Variables and Univariate Analysis 
 
3.1. Construction of the Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) 
In order to succeed in our goals, we must define the set of governance proxies. The 
sample consists of firms which are listed on the ASE for the sample period from 
January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006. All data are gathered from Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission, DataStream (as far as returns are concerned) as well as from 
the official financial statements of sample firms. 
 
Many researchers have already worked on the selection of these proxies. Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003) adopt 24 factors (or International Responsibility Research 
Center/IRRC provisions), which are comprised into four categories, constructing 
their “G-Index”. Brown and Caylor (2004) take into account 51 provisions, divided 
into eight categories, using Corporate Governance data from Institutional 
Shareholder Services/I.S.S. While Gompers et al. (2003) constructed the G-Index, 
Brown and Caylor (2004) created a summary index called “Gov-Score”. Generally, 
every similar approach follows the 24 provisions of Gompers et al. (2003). It is not 
surprising that plenty of studies have partly or totally used the G-Index testifying the 
negative effects of Corporate Governance provisions (Fahlenbrach, 2003; Klock, 
Mansi and Maxwell, 2003; Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Yermack, 2006). 
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Of course, there is no reason to expect that all the 24 provisions are equally 
responsible neither for the variation of every firm’s Corporate Governance quality 
nor for the stock returns (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2004). Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(2004) point out that only six are the provisions that actually are important in order 
to measure the quality level of Corporate Governance. Their index is called 
Entrenchment-Index. So, while Gompers et al. (2003) have used the G-Index with 
the 24 provisions, Bebchuk and Cohen (2004), Bebchuk et al. (2004) as well as 
Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2005) have used the Entrenchment-Index with the 
six provisions. In total, we follow Bebchuk et al. (2004) and gather six governance 
proxies divided into two categories: the “constitutional” provisions and the 
“takeover readiness” provisions. To be more specific, the first category 
(“constitutional” provisions) embraces four proxies: Staggered boards, Bylaws, 
Charter, and Supermajority. The second category (“takeover readiness” provisions) 
includes two governance proxies: Poison pills and Golden parachutes. All proxies 
are not legal required based on Greek laws but they are rather recommendations to 
managers. 
 
All six proxies of Corporate Governance were embodied in a questionnaire that was 
sent out to all firms of the ASE. The General Index of the ASE enumerates five 
market segments: FTSE/XA 140, FTSE/XA SMALLCAP 80, FTSE/XA MID 40, 
FTSE/XA 20, and FTSE/XA INTERNATIONAL. A company can belong to more 
than one FTSE (market segment). As it is denoted in Table 1, although the volume 
of individual firms is 253, we count a company that belongs to several FTSEs 
respective times. So, our relevant population increases to 350. The number of 304 
firms shows the double or triple enlistments of the 253 listed on the ASE firms. 
Finally, our sample is the 253 individual firms enlisted on the ASE. We notice that 
some firms are enlisted to more than one FTSE. Our sample consists of 253 
individual firms or else of 350 firms, if we count some of them more than one time 
due to double or triple enlistments. 
 
Table 1: Number of firms that responded to the questionnaire per FTSE  
(market segment) 
 
 
 FTSE/XA 140 
FTSE/XA 
SMALLCAP 80 
FTSE/XA 
MID 40 
FTSE/XA 
20 
FTSE/XA 
INTERNATIONAL All 
Responses 128 67 34 13 62 304 
Volume of 
firms per 
market 
segment 
140 80 40 20 70 350 
Percentage of 
responses 91.4% 83.8% 85.0% 65% 88.6% 86.9% 
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The questionnaire was sent out to target firms in July 2006 and the last response was 
given to us at the end of September 2006. One restriction is the sample companies to 
be listed on the ASE at the time period of our research. Although institutional 
investors are less likely to invest in small cap firms, we cannot ignore small firms 
based on their market capitalization (size), because these investors put capital on 
firms, whose number is insufficient for any consideration let alone our analysis. We 
remind that quality of the implementation of Corporate Governance acts as a proxy 
for the monitoring costs of all investors. As Table 1 shows, the response of every 
market segment as well as the total response is more than 80% with the exception of 
firms of FTSE/XA 20 (65%), ignoring the multiple enlistments. 
 
In order to measure the level of every firm’s Corporate Governance, we replicate the 
method of Bebchuk et al. (2004) constructing an index named Corporate 
Governance Quality Level (CGQL) with six scales or grades. We make the 
hypothesis that CGQL is a variable, which can measure risk. Every question of the 
set is a provision or else a limitation to shareholders rights. If a firm has this 
provision or limitation, one point is added to its total score. If the company does not 
have this provision, no point is added. As a rule, the more provisions a firm has, the 
higher score (CGQL) it gets. The relation is disproportional. So, the interpretation is 
straightforward and allows manageable explanations: if a company has an improved 
level of Corporate Governance, then a relatively small score will get in a seven-scale 
answering range2. The minimum score (zero) points out a firm with an exemplary 
quality of Corporate Governance, while the maximum score (six) indicates the 
opposite (total limitation of shareholder rights in favor of managers, directors, 
or/and members of Board of Directors). The CGQL consists of various variables and 
can act as a proxy for monitoring and other various costs. The less CGQL is, the less 
these costs. The hypothesis is that the provisions, which constitute CGQL for every 
single firm, can play the role of a proxy for the risk portion beyond covariance risk 
with a market index. As a result, we will try to transform differences of CGQL into 
perceived risk for shareholders. 
 
As we said before, we use the six provisions to construct CGQL. In order to place it 
as variable, we quantify CGQL using the method of PC Analysis for every single 
question. We place one component and we extract a component score that is referred 
to the level of Corporate Governance quality. Firstly, we make a KMO Sphericity 
test for every Governance portfolio (Democracies and Dictatorships) in order to see 
if the variables (provisions) are correlated (Table 2a). From this Table we figure that 
the variables are correlated. So, we can proceed to the PC Analysis. According to 
the KMO test, the null hypothesis is the covariance matrix of variables is 
proportional to the identity matrix. PC Analysis converts the correlated variables to 
uncorrelated. In Table 2b we mention the structure of factor loadings as well as its 
 
2 CGQL fluctuates from zero to six. 
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differentiation according to the questions for the Governance portfolios. As far as 
Democracy portfolio is concerned, question number 1 (Staggered board) affects 
decisively in the formulation of the component. As far as Dictatorship portfolio is 
concerned, again question number 1 (Staggered board) affects decisively in the 
formulation of the component. From the KMO Sphericity test as far as Democracies 
and Dictatorships are concerned, we notice that variables are correlated. So, we can 
proceed to the PC Analysis. 
 
Table 2a: KMO and Bartlett's Test for democracy portfolio 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy   0.360 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 86.836 
  df 15 
  Sig. 0.000 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy   0.341 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 80.233 
  df 15 
  Sig. 0.000 
 
Table 2b: Factor loading for Democracies and Dictatorships 
 
 
Component Matrix for the democracy portfolio 
 Component 
 1 
Democracy_01 -0.755 
Democracy_02 -0.632 
Democracy_03 0.396 
Democracy_04 0.437 
Democracy_05 0.351 
Democracy_06 0.426 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a1 components extracted 
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Component Matrix for the dictatorship portfolio 
 Component 
 1 
Dictatorship_01 0.735 
Dictatorship_02 -0.104 
Dictatorship_03 0.348 
Dictatorship_04 -0.573 
Dictatorship_05 0.329 
Dictatorship_06 -0.693 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a1 components extracted. 
 
As argued above, every calculation is made over 24 running months (from January 
1, 2004 to January 1, 2006). As there is not any database available in Greece for the 
level of Corporate Governance of firms, we assume that investors’ expectations, as 
far as monitoring and various costs are concerned, are based on an average value of 
Corporate Governance over the sample period, which CGQL fully represents. We 
think that this simplification is neither a bias nor a prejudice. Besides, issues of 
Corporate Governance have received attention only recently in Greece as well as 
this attention has not actually changed during our sample period. 
 
To measure the significance of the correlation between the CGQL and the expected 
rate of return on equity for the listed companies on the ASE, we should set a proxy 
for this return. We rely on two different financial measures as well as on a basic 
valuation ratio: a) historical stock returns (HSR), b) market capitalization (MAC), 
and c) book-to-market ratio (BTM)3. To measure the relationship of CGQL and 
expected rate of return, we insert these variables into a univariate analysis. Every 
single measure as well as its meaning is shown in section 3.2. 
 
3.2. An introduction to Univariate Analysis: Correlations of Corporate 
Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and Financial Measures plus Valuation 
Ratios 
Following Gompers et al. (2003) and Johnson et al. (2005), we construct two 
portfolios with extreme values of CGQL. A “Democracy” portfolio consists of all 
firms, which are fully or almost fully complied with Corporate Governance rules, 
with CGQL 2. Contrary to the above, a “Dictatorship” portfolio is the set of 
companies with the poorest Corporate Governance quality and with CGQL 3. 

 
Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e exhibit results from univariate analysis between 
CGQLs and three control variables, that is HSR, MAC, and BTM (column 1). To be 
more specific, Tables 3a and 3b show the correlations between CGQL and two of 
the three control variables (MAC, BTM) as far as Democracies firms are concerned 
                                                 
3 It is noted that in order to measure BTM, we excluded all negative values as well as all values that 
exceed 10. 
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for years 2004 and 2005 respectively. Tables 3c and 3d show the same correlation 
but for Dictatorships again for years 2004, 2005 respectively. In columns 1 of these 
Tables, MAC represents the annual market capitalization computed at the 31st of 
December of each year4, and BTM represents yearly book-to-market ratios 
following the methodology of Johnson et al. (2005). Furthermore, in columns 2 of 
Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e is exhibited the correlation and the statistic significance 
of each independent variable (HSR, MAC, and BTM) with CGQL. All values are 
equally-weighted. No specific Corporate Governance regulation exists for particular 
market segments of the ASE. So, including all sample firms in our analysis when 
HSR is calculated does not meet any biases. HSR is the geometric mean of monthly 
stock returns of our sample period. Table 3e shows the correlation of CGQL with 
HSR for both Democracies and Dictatorships. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses underneath the results of the coefficients. 
 
For all measures of expected rate of return the correlation with CGQL is not 
statistically significant. As a result no secure conclusion can be drawn for 
fundamental financial and valuation characteristics of Democracies or for 
Dictatorships, since these characteristics do not seem to be adopted by firms with 
specific Corporate Governance quality levels. 
 
In addition, the third and the fourth columns show the means for the variables of the 
first column as far as Democracies and Dictatorships are concerned respectively. 
Column 5 gives the means for each variable for all sample firms. In this section, the 
results point out that there is no tendency for fundamental financial and valuation 
characteristics to be adopted by firms with specific CGQL. Although these results 
are important and call into question Corporate Governance and its relation with 
expected returns, multiple variables need to enter regressions, in order to draw much 
more credible and robust conclusions. 
 
Table 3a: Summary statistics for CGQL variable and fundamental measures of 
expected rate of return for the Democracy portfolio in year 2004  
(the mean of MAC is in million euros) 
 
  Columns    
1 2 3 4 5 
Measures 
(Variables) 
Correlation 
with CGQL 
Mean of 
Democracies’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
Dictatorships’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
all sample 
firms 
MAC 0.01 (0.35) 359 129 253 
                                                 
4 Due to the serious deficiency of published financial statements, with the exception of the annual, the 
market capitalization is computed annually and not in a monthly base as the stock returns. 
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BTM -0.02 (-0.29) 1.01 1.67 1.32 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 3b: Summary statistics for CGQL variable and fundamental measures of 
expected rate of return for the Democracy portfolio in year 2005  
(the mean of MAC is in million euros) 
 
  Columns    
1 2 3 4 5 
Measures 
(Variables) 
Correlation 
with CGQL 
Mean of 
Democracies’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
Dictatorships’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of all 
sample firms 
MAC 0.01 (0.27) 359 129 253 
BTM 0.07 (0.50) 1.01 1.67 1.32 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 3c: Summary statistics for CGQL variable and fundamental measures of expected rate of 
return for the Dictatorship portfolio in year 2004  
(the mean of MAC is in million euros) 
 
  Columns    
1 2 3 4 5 
Measures 
(Variables) 
Correlation 
with 
CGQL 
Mean of 
Democracies’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
Dictatorships’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of all 
sample firms 
MAC 0.01 (0.54) 359 129 253 
BTM 0.01 (0.03) 1.01 1.67 1.32 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 3d: Summary statistics for CGQL variable and fundamental measures of 
expected rate of return for the Dictatorship portfolio in year 2005  
(the mean of MAC is in million euros) 
 
  Columns    
1 2 3 4 5 
Measures 
(Variables) 
Correlation 
with 
CGQL 
Mean of 
Democracies’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
Dictatorships’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
all sample 
firms 
MAC 0.01 (0.29) 359 129 253 
BTM -0.03 (-0.42) 1.01 1.67 1.32 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3e: Summary statistics for CGQL variable and HSRs for the Democracy 
portfolio and the Dictatorship portfolio for the sample period 
 
  Columns    
1 2 3 4 5 
Measure 
(Variable) 
Correlation 
with CGQL 
Mean of 
Democracies’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of 
Dictatorships’ 
Portfolio 
Mean of all 
sample 
firms 
HSR for 
Democracy 
portfolio 
4.18 
(1.27) -0.78  -1.05 
HSR for 
Dictatorship 
portfolio 
-3.45 
(-1.03)  -1.37 -1.05 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
4. Corporate Governance and Risk Factors 
 
4.1. Governance Portfolios’ Returns and the Three-Factor Model 
From the results of Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e we suspect that no disparate returns 
exist among listed firms on the ASE owe to their level of Corporate Governance. To 
begin with, in order to confirm or to exclude alike assumptions, we run the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993) for the sample period (years 2004, 2005) 
trying to capture any speculative differences between Democracies’ and 
Dictatorships’ returns, examining at the same time if the returns of enlisted 
companies on the ASE are normal or not, as well as the factors – including 
Corporate Governance – which generate abnormal (if any) returns. A vast amount of 
empirical research indicates that market risk (beta) by itself5 is inadequate in 
explaining the expected returns and that other factors such as market capitalization 
(size) (Fama and French, 1993), book-to-market ratio (Fama and French, 1993), 
immediate past stock returns (momentum) (Fama and French, 1993), as well as other 
measures (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) can sufficiently and significantly 
explain cross-section returns. We examine if the Greek capital market is efficient as 
well as if any control variable stand for proxies of systematic risk. Our hypothesis is 
that at least one control variable (size, book-to-market ratio or market risk) causes at 
least partly the (if any) differences in the stock returns between Democracies and 
Dictatorships. Using the O.L.S. Method, we compute the following model:     tttttDICTDEM HMLSMBRfRmaRR   321 (2) 
 
Where: 
Dependent variable  tDICTDEM RR   is the difference between the returns of the 
Democracy portfolio and the Dictatorship portfolio in month t. 
                                                 
5 The single-index model of Sharpe (1963). 
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Independent/explanatory variable  shows the difference between market 
return and the risk-free rate in month t. 
fm RR 
Independent/explanatory variable  (Small Minus Big) indicates the return 
difference between portfolios with small size and those with large size in month t. 
tSMB
Independent/explanatory variable  (High Minus Low) gives the return 
difference between portfolios with high book-to-market ratios and those with low 
book-to-market ratios in month t. 
tHML
a  is the intercept of the equation. 
t  is the residual. 
 
All returns are value-weighted using market capitalization. This method is 
preferable, because al value-weighted components contribute to the variance 
minimisation, particularly when returns’ variances are negatively correlated with 
total market capitalization (Fama and French, 1993). Intercept coefficient (a) 
controls for abnormal returns of the market on an investment strategy that buys 
Democracies and sells short Dictatorships. The sample period is extended from 
January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006. As far as variables are concerned, 
 is the return difference for every month between Democracy 
portfolio’s returns and Dictatorship portfolio’s returns. Variable  denotes 
the monthly difference between the return of the General Index of ASE ( ) and 
the return of a risk-free 3-year Greek bond ( ). Then, we compute  and 
 according to Fama and French (1993), Gompers et al. (2003) as well as 
Johnson et al. (2005).  denotes the monthly return difference between a 
portfolio that constitutes of big size firms and a portfolio which constitutes of small 
size companies.  constitutes the monthly return difference between a 
portfolio that constitutes of high book-to-market (BTM) firms and a portfolio which 
constitutes of low book-to-market (BTM) companies. Median is used for these 
portfolio separations. Table 4 gives the regression results of the three-factor model 
of equation (2). 
 tDICTDEM RR 
tHML

fm RR 
SMB
mR
tfR
tSMB
tHML
 
In Table 4, intercept “a” is statistically significant at the 10% level, rejecting the 
CAPM. This indicates that the ASE is not an efficient market confirming the results 
of other researches in Greece (Kavussanos and Dockery, 2001). Furthermore, alpha 
is positive, which indicates that Democracies tend to gain larger abnormal returns 
than Dictatorships. The regression results show that the coefficient of  enters 
with a negative sign at the 1% level of significance. Variable  is not 
significant. Taken into account the results from Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d, we 
tHML
tSMB
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
confirm that size in not a factor that characterizes enlisted firms on the ASE with a 
high quality of Corporate Governance. Surprisingly, market risk (coefficient of 
) is not able to explain the monthly excess returns of Democracies. fm RR 
 
If the independent variables are factors of systematic risk, then the dependent 
variable  tDICTDEM RR   can be explained by the book-to-market ratio but only 
partly, because the intercept is not equal to zero. Following Gompers et al. (2003), 
alpha is 1.48 that equals to 148 basis points per month, or to 17.76% yearly. 
Corporate Governance, as it is measured by CGQL, is not able to create abnormal 
returns. As a result, other factors (differences in firm value as value is expressed 
through book-to-market ratios) are responsible for making Greek stock market 
inefficient. T-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the results of the 
coefficients. 
 
Table 4: Results from the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). 
     tttttDICT HMLSMBRfRmaRDEMR   321  
Variables and 
Factor Intercept (α) RMRF SMB HML 
Coefficients 1.48* (1.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
-0.24*** 
(-2.88) 
 
R2 0.35    
Adjus. R2 0.25    
F-Prob. 0.03    
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) 1.32    
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
4.2. Does Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) determine the volume 
of the result of the Three-Facto Model (Abnormal Returns) among firms on the 
ASE? 
  
While we found abnormal returns through the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993), it is essential to use a second model that measures the volume of 
these returns as well as to try to detect if CGQL acts as a risk proxy for the volume 
of abnormal returns. Also, in this analysis we make use of a fundamental factor that 
may determine, at least partly, this range of abnormal returns in favor of 
Democracies. Our multi-variate analysis continues after controlling for abnormal 
returns in the ASE. In this subsection we use the procedure of Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHARs) to measure the volume of these returns and we will 
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seek to find a relationship not only with CGQL but also with a valuation ratio named 
Tobin’s Q for every Governance portfolio. 
 
As we mention above, the statistically significant alpha indicates that the control 
variables of the Fama and French (1993) model cannot be interpreted as the only 
proxies of risk factors. So, let alone the variables of the three-factor model, they do 
exist other factors that cause stock returns shifts. As it is already known, firm value 
can be measured using the Tobin’s Q ratio. It is the ratio of a firm’s market value via 
the replacement cost of its assets (Tobin and Brainard, 1968). Tobin’s Q ratio is 
vastly used the last decades as a measure of performance (Thomadakis, 1977; 
Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Salinger, 1984; Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall, 1984; 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991; 
Hanson and Song, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2003). Abnormal returns 
are created, if a company is valued more than the cost that would have been 
necessary as a requirement in order to be rebuilt. 
 
In many cases, so as in ours, another approach of Tobin’s Q ratio is adopted, due to 
the fact that the calculation of the preliminary form of this complex ratio bears 
difficulties. Chung and Pruitt (1994) as well as Perfect and Wiles (1994) developed 
a form of Tobin’s Q named Approximate Tobin’s Q. Due to its simplicity and 
accuracy (only basic and published financial and accounting factors) it is widely 
used. Actually, Tobin’s Q of company i in time period t is the vulgar fraction with 
nominator the sum of stock market value as well as short- and long-term liabilities, 
and with denominator the book value of total assets all in time period t. To begin 
with, we calculate for the sample period monthly BHARs for these two Governance 
portfolios, following Barber and Lyon (1997) as well as Alexandrou and 
Sudarsanam (2001). The monthly return of the General Index of the ASE is used as 
the expected return-as the benchmark (Thalassinos and Politis, 2011). . 
 
Using a linear regression model, we test if Tobin’s Q as well as CGQL can cause a 
shift to abnormal returns. To be more exact, our hypothesis is that firm value, as it is 
measured by Tobin’s Q ratio, indicates another meaningful risk factor for 
Democracies as well as for Dictatorships, by causing statistically significant changes 
of stock returns. We compute annually Tobin’s Q ratios (TQRs) and BHARs for 
every firm i. Specifically, to account for and confirm our hypotheses, we estimate 
the following regression for every sample year (years 2004, 2005) and for every 
Governance portfolio: 
iiii CGQLTQRaBHAR   21       (3) 
 
Where: 
iBHAR  is the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return of firm i in year t 
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iTQR  is the Tobin’s Q ratio of firm i in year t 
iCGQL  is the Corporate Governance score of firm i in the sample period (years 
2004, 2005) as it is measured from the PC Analysis. 
 
Tables 5a and 5b show the results of the regression (3) for the Democracy portfolio 
and for the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. Tables 6a and 6b report the results for 
the Dictatorship portfolio for the same sample years. In all cases, the coefficient of 
 enter with a positive sign. Particularly,  is significant at the 1% level 
with the exception of the Democracy portfolio of year 2004 (significant at the 10% 
level).  overall explanatory power is low. The same low explanatory power 
exists even if  was the only independent variable in regression model (3)
iTQR iTQR
iCGQL
iCGQL 6 
both for Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios as well as for all sample sub periods 
(years 2004, 2005). T-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the results of 
the coefficients. 
 
It is shown clearly that Corporate Governance is a factor that neither increases nor 
decreases abnormal returns. The volume of these returns that characterize the ASE 
as an inefficient capital market can be explained sufficiently through a financial ratio 
such as Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 5a: Results from the correlation between BHARs, firm value, and CGQL  
for the Democracy portfolio of year 2004. 
 
iiii CGQLTQRaBHAR   21  
Variables and 
Factors Intercept (α) ΤQR CGQL 
Democracy 
portfolio 
-0.65*** 
(-14.38) 
0.21*** 
(6.47) 
0.05 
(1.64) 
R2 0.24   
Adjus.R2 0.23   
F-Prob. 0.00   
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) 1.93   
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
                                                 
6 In a univariate regression without  the coefficient of  remained insignificant. tiTQR , iCGQL
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Table 5b: Results from the correlation between BHARs, firm value, and CGQL  
for the Democracy portfolio of year 2005 
 
iiii CGQLTQRaBHAR   21  
Variables and 
Factors Intercept (α) ΤQR CGQL 
Democracy 
portfolio 
-0.36 
(-1.02) 
0.39* 
(1.80) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
R2 0.02   
Adjus.R2 0.01   
F-Prob. 0.20   
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) 2.04   
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 6a: Results from the correlation between BHARs, firm value, and CGQL  
for the Dictatorship portfolio of year 2004. 
 
iiii CGQLTQRaBHAR   21  
Variables and 
Factors Intercept (α) ΤQR CGQL 
Dictatorship 
portfolio 
-0.68*** 
(-11.79) 
0.28*** 
(4.29) 
-0.04 
(-1.26) 
R2 0.15   
Adjus.R2 0.13   
F-Prob. 0.00   
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) 2.39   
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 6b: Results from the correlation between BHARs, firm value, and CGQL  
for the Dictatorship portfolio of year 2005. 
 
iiii CGQLTQRaBHAR   21  
Variables and 
Factors Intercept (α) ΤQR CGQL 
Dictatorship 
portfolio 
-0.31*** 
(-4.49) 
0.19*** 
(3.12) 
-0.05 
(-1.03) 
R2 0.09   
Adjus.R2 0.07   
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F-Prob. 0.01   
Durbin-Watson 
statistic (d) 1.62   
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
5. Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and Expected Return on 
Equity as expressed by Geometric Means of Historical Stock Returns 
 
In this section, we measure the relationship between CGQL and expected rate of 
return. It is assumed that historical stock returns [ iTr  of equation (1)] are sufficient 
proxies for expected rates of return (Drobetz et al., 2004). Because the market is 
imperfect, agency and various other costs exist, making the expected returns on 
equity to include risk that is not related to the stock’s beta. 
 
In this section we adopt an alternative approach. Our goal is to examine if the level 
of the quality implementation of Corporate Governance, as expressed by variable 
CGQL, can account for the stock returns’ differences against market beta. If there is 
a significant correlation between CGQL and expected returns in a cross-section of 
firms, then beta is not the only risk factor that determines the price performance of 
listed firms in the ASE. 
 
Our rationale is rather simple and straightforward7: if no agency costs existed, then 
the CAPM would not be rejected and the market of the ASE would be efficient. 
However, as we have already shown, the world of the ASE (and generally of almost 
every single capital market) is conquered by agency costs. According to the agency 
theory, Dictatorships should experience higher returns, as compensation to investors 
for paying associated costs (agency, auditing, and monitoring costs). The sample 
period ranges from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006. 
 
Firstly, we estimate the betas of companies using monthly stock returns and the 
monthly return of the General Index of the ASE as market return. Secondly, we 
estimate the equation (1) for every Governance portfolio. Contrast to the agency 
theory, we hypothesize that the level of Corporate Governance, as expressed through 
variable CGQL, will be positively related to the returns on equity. Regression results 
are shown in Table 7. Again, t-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the 
results of the coefficients. Our hypothesis does not hold for any of the regressions. 
Columns 1 of Tables 7a and 7b underline the value of coefficient, its significance 
level, and t-statistics if the only independent variable in equation (1) is the firms’ 
betas. In other words, in columns 1 we find the results of the CAPM. In columns 2 
of Tables 7a and 7b we introduce CGQL variable of equation (1) excluding betas. 
                                                 
7 For a more complex approach see Lombardo and Pagano (2000) and Lombardo (2000). 
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Finally, in the last columns, both variables (beta and CGQL) are taken into account 
at the right-hand member of equation (1). 
 
As far as Democracies are concerned, beta in column 1 enters with a negative 
coefficient, although it tends to zero, not in line with the theoretical predictions8. In 
addition, in a univariate analysis beta is significant at the 5% level.  
 
In column 2 a univariate analysis with CGQL follows. As it is directly observed, the 
explanatory power of CGQL is rather inexistent. Finally, in column 3 we control for 
systematic risk. The null hypothesis that 02   is acceptable due to the 
insignificance of CGQL’s coefficient. As far as Dictatorship portfolio is concerned, 
we actually draw the same conclusions. This indicates that an adoption of a high 
quality Corporate Governance code by the enlisted companies on the ASE does not 
lead to higher returns on equity. It seems that investors do not value the lower costs 
of monitoring and auditing when they invest on stocks. 
 
Table 7a: Regression returns ( iTr ) of equation (1) for the Democracy portfolio  
from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006 
 
 Columns 
Democracy portfolio 1 2 3 
Independent Variables    
i  -0.01** (-2.15)  -0.01* (-1.98) 
iCGQL   0.01 (1.27) 0.01 (0.96) 
R2 0.03 0.01 0.04 
Adjus.R2 0.03 0.01 0.03 
F-Prob. 0.03 0.21 0.07 
Durbin-Watson statistic (d) 2.15 2.16 2.18 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
                                                 
8 We notice that all R-squares are rather low. Defenders of the CAPM would argue that the 
model deals with expected returns, while we can only observe actual returns. Actual returns 
reflect expectations, but they also embody “noise” related to the flow of surprises (Drobetz et 
al., 2004). This is the reason why we assume that historical returns are good proxies for 
expected rates of return. 
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Table 7b: Regression returns ( iTr )of equation (1) for the Dictatorship portfolio from 
January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006 
 
 Columns 
Dictatorship portfolio 1 2 3 
Independent Variables    
i  -0.01*** (-3.33)  -0.01*** (-3.25) 
iCGQL   -0.01 (-1.03) -0.01 (-0.82) 
R2 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Adjus.R2 0.08 0.01 0.08 
F-Prob. 0.00 0.31 0.00 
Durbin-Watson statistic (d) 1.71 1.75 1.73 
*** Significant at the 1% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  * Significant at the 10% level 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Corporate Governance in Greece has attracted some attention in the last years. 
Researches in foreign capital markets have shown that investors are willing to pay a 
premium for a company with high quality of Corporate Governance compared to 
another identical company but with a poor quality of Corporate Governance, as well 
as, firm value is specified not only by financial factors but also by the quality of 
Corporate Governance. In our study, we stress that the only plausible variables are 
the six provisions Bebchuk et al. (2004) have pointed out, in order to build reliable 
conclusions between Corporate Governance and other factors. Again, we underline 
that all selected proxies are not legal required based on Greek laws but they are 
rather recommendations to managers. Our results do not show any existence of 
significant differences between Democracies and Dictatorships. 
 
The answer to all the questions that concern us throughout our research is alike. 
Corporate Governance cannot create nor control abnormal returns between the listed 
firms on the ASE. To raise the point differently, Corporate Governance does not 
matter from an asset pricing perspective and it cannot be regarded as an additional 
risk factor for investors. Furthermore, Corporate Governance cannot be a 
“substitute” for market risk (beta). Listed firms on the ASE must find another way to 
increase their perceived valuation. The Greek capital market can be characterized as 
a rather traditional market that does not keep pace with the evolution and the use of 
non-quantified measures of firm attractiveness. This can be interpreted by the fact 
that investors in Greece are rather passive in monitoring and disciplining incumbent 
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management teams as well as Corporate Governance is an issue that only very 
recently has received some attention from investors. 
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